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Abstract  
Following Kuznets’ pioneering works, the growth-inequality nexus was stylised as an inverted U-
shaped relation. As per that paradigm, economic inequality initially increases when a nation 
embarks upon a modern economic development process, but later on, declines as the development 
process cross a certain threshold. The paradigm roughly bears out the experience of the 
industrialised countries of Europe and North America from the beginning of the nineteenth century 
up to the mid-1970s. The inevitability of the pattern came under question when data from a broader 
range of countries became available by the 1970s. Then the post-globalisation experience of 
countries around the world virtually negated the falling part of Kuznets inverted U. Most countries 
which profited from globalisation in the form of upward shifts of their growth trajectories also 
experienced a rise rather than a decline in economic inequality. The present paper is a survey of the 
large and interesting literature on the changing nature of inequality before and after globalisation. 
The survey finds that inequality across countries has actually declined as a result of globalisation 
whereas inequalities within countries have almost invariably increased. Apart from usual factors 
such as bequest and skewed distributions of wealth, the new factors that have accentuated post-
globalisation inequality are widening wage disparities, inequalities of opportunities, the onslaught 
of automation and rent-seeking activities of a section of the rich. The survey also notes how 
inequality has been moderated in some counties through effective taxes and transfer programmes. 
After summarising the arguments why growing economic inequality cannot be left unattended, the 
survey concludes with an outline of the policy choices which are being currently discussed in the 
academic and administrative circles. 
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Introduction 
A subject which has received the attention of 
thinkers and researchers in the 21st Century is 
the growing economic inequality in most parts of 
the globe. According to early thinking in 
Development Economics, inequality first 
increases when, an economy embarks upon the 
modern development process, but later declines 
as development level crosses a certain 
threshold. This pattern seemed to bear out the 
experience in western industrialised countries in 
the 19th Century and the better part of the 20th 
Century. However, since the mid-1970s, as 
globalisation gathered momentum and 
countries in different parts of the world shifted 
to higher growth trajectories, inequalities began 
to rise rather than decline further. The rise in 
inequality in the last four decades has caught the 
attention of many scholars who have looked into 
its nature and dimensions, geographical pattern, 
causal factors of inequality and the possible 
ways of mitigating it. The present study is an 
attempt to capture the gist of this vast and 
growing literature with the expectation that 
interested readers, researchers and 
administrators will find the write-up useful as a 
ready reference to the subject. 
The study has been organised in six sections. The 
next section is a review of the theoretical debate 
on the growth-inequality nexus. The section 
following this describes the post-globalisation 
paradigm of inequality. It then goes to discuss 
the factors contributing to accentuation of 
inequality within countries. This is followed by a 
section recounting the arguments why 
inequality cannot be left unattended. Measures 
suggested for addressing inequality in the 
21stCentury are discussed in the concluding 
section.  
The Growth - Inequality Nexus 
In the 1950s and 1960s, economists, including 
Kuznets (1955) and Kaldor (1955) argued that 
there exists a trade-off between reducing 
inequality and promoting growth. The emphasis 
of early development economists was on raising 
the rate of saving in the less developed countries 
so that the countries could break free from the 
vicious circle of poverty by amassing enough 
capital. Striving to reduce mass poverty by 
reducing inequality was seen as contrary to this 
goal, as the poor were expected to mostly 
consume away their enhanced income than save 
the same for capital formation. Instead, a higher 
degree of initial inequality would yield larger 
aggregate saving, greater capital accumulation, 
and higher growth. Kuznets’ empirical works 
extended support to the trade-off theory in the 
form of his inverted U hypothesis. Kuznets 
(1963) concludes that the level of income 
inequality rises during the early stage of 
development, hits a maximum and stop rising 
during the middle phase, and then declines 
during the later stages of development. The 
driving force behind the whole process is 
industrialisation, coupled with urbanisation. To 
begin with, less developed economies have large 
proportions of their population in the traditional 
agricultural sector. As modern industries with 
higher productivity emerge, workers begin to 
shift from the traditional sector to higher-paying 
modern sectors. In the process, inequality begins 
to rise (Wolff, 2009). In the later stages of the 
development process, as benefits of growth start 
trickling down to the left-out sections of society, 
the society moves towards an equal distribution. 
Because of the migration of people from 
agriculture to industry, the pressure of 
population on land in rural areas decreases, 
leading to an increase in per capita income from 
land. Further, within the modern sector, 
expansion of education also reduces income 
inequality (Wolff, 2009).  
Piketty (2015, pp 18-22), however, points out 
that the downturn in the inverted U, observed in 
the industrialised countries in the first three-
quarters of the 20th Century, was not so much 
because of the ‘natural’ economic process 
perceived by Kuznets and others but due to (a) 
shocks incurred by wealth owners in 1914-1945 
in the forms of wars, inflation and the great 
depression, (b) progressive taxation first 
initiated by France in 1914 and then followed by 
others, and (c) the rise of labour unions and 
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welfare measures in the post-second World War 
decades. Analysing Kuznets process from a 
political economy angle Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2002) argue that capitalist industrialisation 
tends to increase inequality, but this inequality 
leads to its own destruction because it induces a 
change in the political and policy regimes. Rising 
social tension from increased inequality forces 
equalising political reforms which eventually 
bend the curve downward.  
With cross-country longitudinal data are 
becoming available since the 1970s, a counter-
argument to the growth-equity trade-off started 
to emerge. Using these data, Todaro and Smith 
(2013) contested Kuznets’ hypothesis by 
showing that per capita income is not necessarily 
related to inequality. They pointed out that 
some low-income countries like Ethiopia had low 
inequality, whereas other low-income countries 
such as Mozambique and Zambia had far higher 
inequality. Similarly, some countries in the 
middle-income range had high inequality, but 
many middle-income countries had low 
inequality too. Among high-income countries 
also, inequality was high in the United States and 
Spain but low in Norway. They concluded that 
growth and inequality could manifest in various 
alternative patterns. The fundamental issue is 
how the size of national income is expanded; 
whether by a few or by many. If a few generate 
it, then the fruits of growth are shared by a small 
segment of the population; but if it is generated 
by the many, then the fruits of growth are shared 
more evenly. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Jacobs 
(2000), Kurian (2000) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) also found evidence negating a standard 
relationship between inequality and growth. 
Empirical evidence is thus ambiguous regarding 
the nature of nexus between inequality and 
growth. What these shreds of evidence establish 
with certainty is that a trade-off between equity 
and growth is not inevitable. 
The New Paradigm of Inequality Post 
Globalisation 
Globalisation process of the last part of the 20th 
Century, compounded with the pervasiveness of 
information technology, imparted a 
considerable change like economic activities and 
their organisation all over the world. There was 
impressive growth in the most part of the world 
until the process was jolted by the global 
financial crisis of 2007 that triggered recessions 
in many counties and economic slowdown in the 
others. The stylised patterns based on old facts 
and perception could no longer capture the 
patterns that emerged under the new dynamics. 
As per Kuznets’ inverted u hypothesis, most 
countries should have experienced a decline in 
inequality from the prolonged run of economic 
growth. But studies reveal that inequality 
actually increased in most countries including 
the USA, China, and India. Kuznets inverted-U 
curve has given way to Milanovic’s Elephant 
Curve for portraying income distribution in the 
post-globalised world.  
Lakner and Milanovic (2016) plotted income gain 
during 1998-2008 of each percentile of world 
population by income distribution of 1988. The 
emerging curve resembles the outline of an 
elephant, with the trunk pointed up on the right. 
Corlett (2016) divides the elephant curve into 
three parts corresponding to three groups of 
income holders. The first group is around 50th 
percentile (global median). This population 
occupying the middle portion of the graph 
received the largest increase in income shares 
and thus is the prime beneficiaries of 
globalisation. This segment of world population 
is mostly comprised of the people from the 
emerging Asian economies, including China, 
India, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The 
second group is around the 80th percentile. The 
shape of the curve implies that this group 
experienced a 20-year stagnation of real income. 
Most of the people in this group are citizens of 
the old-rich countries of Western Europe and 
North America. Milanovic (2018) calls them the 
lower middle class of the rich world, who are not 
the winners of globalisation. The third group is 
the wealthiest one per cent of the world’s 
population, whose income continued to grow 
sharply in contrast to that of the second group. 
People who belong to the global top one per 
cent are overwhelmingly from the rich 
economies including the United States, Japan, 
and Oceania. While the elephant curve portrays 
some interesting feature of the change in global 
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income distribution over the period concerned, 
the pattern is usually not distinct in the 
distributions within individual countries. When 
the elephant curve is drawn for individual 
countries, then it tends to slope upwards more 
or less continuously implying that the rich 
gaining more than the poor within countries 
(The Economist, 2016). Thus, it seems that post-
globalisation inequality across nations has 
declined substantially, while inequalities within 
a nation have gone up nearly everywhere (Roy & 
Roy, 2018). Milanovic (2018) referred to this 
phenomenon as the ‘Inequality Paradox’. 
Bourguignon (2015) throws further insights into 
the post-globalisation inequality pattern.  After 
rising steadily for about two centuries from 
1800, he observes, inequality in standard of 
living among countries has started to decline 
since 1980. For illustration, he shows that the 
average standard of living in France or Germany 
was twenty times higher than in China or India in 
1980. Two decades later, this gap was cut in half. 
On the other hand, inequality within most 
economies – developed and emerging - has 
increased. For an explanation Bourguignon 
(2015: 3-4) writes:  
The expansion of international trade, the 
mobility of capital and labour (notably for 
the most skilled), and the spread of 
technological innovation have partially 
bridged the gap between the wealthiest 
countries and the developing countries. 
But, at the same time, they have also 
contributed to a change in income 
distribution within these economies. 
Global economic growth has led to 
certain lines of production emigrating 
from developed countries to emerging 
ones, with the result that the demand for 
unskilled labour has shrunk in more 
advanced countries—which has led to a 
drop in its relative compensation. The 
international mobility of top skills and the 
growth of global trade have meant that 
across the world the high end of the wage 
distribution falls in line with that of the 
countries where economic elites are the 
best compensated, and the income 
stream from capital is everywhere 
increasing faster than that from labour 
(Bourguignon 2015, pp 3-4)  
Further, he points out that growth which was 
earlier mostly concentrated in countries 
constituting only about 10% of the world 
population has now shifted to more populous 
parts of the world including China and India. 
Thus income is getting redistributed in favour of 
the latter group of countries accounting for a 
much larger percentage of the world population. 
In broad conformity with Bourguignon (2015), 
Deaton (2013) and Milanovic (2018) also find 
that the gaps in average incomes of developed 
and developing countries have been shrinking. 
Nevertheless, he notes that among the 
developing countries, many have not been able 
to close the gap.  
Inequalities within countries have, of course, 
continued to increase everywhere except in a 
few countries such as Denmark, the 
Scandinavian Countries and Vietnam in the 
1990s (Vanham, 2018). In all these cases, 
progressive and effective taxes and transfers 
policies of the respective governments have had 
a role. 
Factors Contributing to Inequality Within 
Nations 
The scholarly works probing post-globalisation 
rise in inequality have identified several 
conventional and nonconventional factors 
contributing to the process of widening 
inequalities within countries.  
Piketty (2014) sees rise in inequality as an 
outcome of higher-income shares accruing to 
capital. He shows that the long-term the 
historical rate of return on capital has been 
between 4% and 5%, which is higher than the 
rate of growth of overall income. This, he argues, 
implies an ever-increasing inequality of wealth 
and income, in the absence of strong 
redistributive policies.  
Nevertheless, a significant feature of post-
globalisation inequality is that it has been caused 
not only by the unequal distribution of value-
added between labour and capital but also by 
wage dispersion between privileged workers in 
Hassan & Bezbaruah. Space and Culture, India 2020, 8:1  Page | 72 
 
the formal sector (public sector and big 
corporations) and precarious workers with 
limited contracts, temporary or leased work and 
in the informal sector. The share of informal 
employment, for instance, is more than 80% in 
India (OECD, 2011). Widening of wage 
differentials is ascribed to mainly two factors, 
viz, inequality in educational opportunities and 
automation. Stiglitz (2012) observes that the 
high cost of education needed for high paying 
jobs keeps such education out of reach of the 
most from disadvantaged economic 
backgrounds. Inequality of educational 
opportunities not only limits the upward 
mobility of ordinary working-class members but 
by keeping competition for highly paid work 
limited, it allows wages for such jobs soaring.  
Automation process, on the other hand, has 
been squeezing out jobs of unskilled and 
semiskilled workers (Yan, 2016), thereby 
contributing to keeping wages for such jobs low. 
Several other studies have highlighted unequal 
access to education and resulting disparity in 
human capital formation as a significant 
contributory factor to present-day economic 
inequality in different parts of the globe. Using 
1980 the US Census micro-data, Bishop et al., 
(1992) found that inequality is directly related to 
the level of per capita property income and the 
inequality in education. Rao (1999) confirms that 
the same holds for eight East Asian Economies of 
Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Using 
nationally representative household survey data 
for India for the years 1983, 1993-94 and 2004-
05, Sarkar and Mehta (2010) find that among 
different variables influencing inequality years of 
schooling is the most significant.  
Given that inequalities exist, market 
imperfections seem to reinforce it further. As 
Okun (2015, pp 77-78) puts it:   
By the impersonal criterion of the ideal 
market, everyone contemplating the 
same investment project should face 
exactly the same interest costs. That does 
not happen. In fact, the projects of the 
well-to-do typically get favoured 
treatment. The reverse side of this coin of 
favouritism for the wealthy is 
discrimination against the poor. The 
resulting inefficiency and inequality of 
opportunity curb investment by the poor 
in setting up businesses, in buying homes, 
in education, and in all forms of human 
capital.  
The problem is compounded by the fact that 
low-income families generally face vastly higher 
effective interest rates than do average 
households.   
To the extent government interventions through 
taxes and transfer moderate-income 
distribution within counties, the gap between 
incomes of the rich and the poor is the result of 
government policy. Stiglitz (2013) reports that 
taxes have become less progressive as top 
income tax rates, corporate taxes, and wealth 
taxes have been reduced to prevent tax evasion, 
which has become more effortless in the 
globalised world. The tax base shifted toward 
consumption, sales, and value-added taxes, 
which are inherently regressive. However, 
transfers often missed the target. The problem is 
more acute in emerging economies as the shares 
of taxes and social spending in GDP are lower in 
these countries than in advanced economies. 
OECD (2011) observes that emerging economies 
are also much less efficient in correcting the 
market distribution of income, as they rely much 
more on consumption taxes than on personal 
income taxes. Gupta (2014) also concludes that 
emerging economies, in particular the Latin 
American ones, are much less efficient in 
reducing market inequality via taxes and social 
spending. Byanyima (2019) observes that in 
Brazil, the tax rate on the most deficient 10% is 
higher than that of the top 10%. Lawson & 
Martin (2018) accordingly concludes that 
economic inequality in a country depends more 
on the political will of its government than its 
total stock of wealth.  
Dwelling on the political economy angle of rising 
of inequality Atkinson (2015) argues that the rich 
can influence government policy in order to 
protect their wealth. When governments 
prioritise low inflation over low unemployment 
or low taxes over investment in health 
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infrastructure and education, they are 
responding to the preferences of the rich. 
Wealthy citizens not only cast their vote but also 
influence elections through other means like 
donations. In this sense, excessive wealth 
inequality can undermine democracy (Basu, 
2017).  
Rampant rent-seeking has been cited as another 
contributing factor to inequality. An individual 
who invests in something that will not improve 
the productivity of the economy but only raises 
his own income from some special undue favour, 
is a rent seeker (Tullock, 1980). Rent-seeking can 
include corruption, license capturing, piracy, 
lobbying the government for undue favour. Thus 
rent-seeking is like trying to get a larger slice of 
the cake, without expanding the size of the cake. 
It is a zero-sum game where the rent seeker’s 
gain is somebody else’s loss.  In this context, 
some authors seek to distinguish between ‘good 
inequality’ and ‘bad inequality’ (Rodrik, 2014). 
Inequality arising from rent-seeking is labelled as 
bad as it does create new wealth for society. The 
idea of good inequality, on the other hand, is 
based on the conventional equity efficiency 
trade-off. The proponents of good inequality 
believe that firms and individuals need the 
prospect or incentive of moving up by taking up 
productive investments which while securing 
higher income for the investors also make 
available higher volume goods and services for 
the use of the society at large.  
Given that some inequality is inevitable in 
modern-day society, many scholars have now 
turned their attention to decomposing total 
inequality into ‘fair inequality’ and ‘unfair 
inequality’ (Checchi et al., 2010; Hussey & Jetter, 
2017). An individual’s well-being is expected to 
be determined partly by his/her choice and 
partly by circumstances beyond the individual’s 
control. Roemer (1998) labels factors over which 
individuals have control as “effort”, and factors 
for which individuals cannot be held responsible 
as “circumstances” Unfair inequality is 
understood as that part of inequality which is 
attributable to circumstantial factors such as 
race, caste, gender a. over which the individual 
has no control (Brunori, 2016). On the other 
hand, inequality arising from individuals moving 
ahead up the ladder by sheer “effort” is 
considered fair. The ethical principle underlying 
the distinction between fair and unfair inequality 
is that any inequality due to circumstances 
beyond individual control being unfair should be 
eliminated. Atkinson (2015), however, argues 
that once intergenerational considerations are 
brought in, branding inequality arising from 
inequality of opportunities as unfair and the rest 
of the inequality as fair may not make much 
sense. He writes:  
Inequality of outcome among today’s 
generation is the source of the unfair 
advantage received by the next 
generation. If we are concerned about 
equality of opportunity tomorrow, we 
need to be concerned about inequality of 
outcome today” (Atkinson, 2015, p. 11).   
Why Inequality Cannot be Left Unattended 
The post-globalisation period of growing income 
inequality also saw a large number of people 
coming out of absolute poverty, especially in 
developing countries including India (Bhagwati 
and Panagariya 2014). This has induced some 
economists to hold the view that there is no 
need to get worked up about growing inequality 
so long as the standard of living of those at the 
bottom stratum of the income distribution keeps 
improving (Dabla-Norris et al, 2015). However, 
works reviewed below tend to suggest that 
growing inequality can be ignored in the long run 
only at the risk of our own peril. 
Both Marx and Keynes hinted at the risk’s 
inequality pose to growth when uneven capital 
accumulation and saving reduce consumption 
and demand. More equal economies have been 
found to have longer spells of growth than those 
characterised by strong inequality (Berg and 
Ostry, 2011; Ostry et al., 2014). Easterly (2007) 
finds empirical evidence from historical data that 
high structural inequality is a significant barrier 
to the prosperity as well as good quality 
institutions and schooling. Khoo and Dennis 
(1999) find from a cross-country study of the 
period 1960 and 1985 that income inequality has 
a negative effect on economic growth. High 
inequality threatens long-term growth, as there 
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is too little investment in human capital. 
Inequality also tends to reduce social mobility 
(Gupta, 2014) and can threaten social and 
political stability and security, thus requiring 
more public and private spending on crime 
control and prevention. Such expenditures 
crowd-out other more productive and growth-
enhancing spending. Perotti (1996) advances a 
further reason why income inequality will be 
harmful to growth. He points out that an 
unequal distribution of income will lead to 
pressure for redistribution of income through 
distortionary taxes and government spending, 
which can jeopardise growth.  
Examining historical evidence, Scheidel (2017) 
concludes that major consequences of 
inequalities are wars, revolutions, state failures 
and pandemics. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) 
also find that high levels of inequality results in 
malfunctioning society, which adversely affects 
the mental health of the society members, 
increases violence, crime and suicide rates and 
educational failure resulting in low social 
mobility. As Roser (2019, p. 6) put it: 
The inequality that we see in the world 
today is the consequence of unequal 
progress. Our generation has the 
opportunity – and responsibility I believe 
– to allow every part of the world to 
develop and transform into a place where 
health, access to education, and 
prosperity is a reality (Roser, 2019, p.6). 
Conclusion 
Given that growing inequality can be a threat in 
itself for social and economic stability, in the long 
run, policy attentions are required to address it. 
The traditional approach of taxes and transfers 
should undoubtedly be a component of the 
policy package. Nevertheless, this conventional 
approach has its own limitation in several forms. 
If taxes are too high, the incentive for 
investments may be adversely affected which in 
turn can reduce the rate of growth which can 
make the task of reducing inequality more 
difficult. Moreover, many newly emerging and 
developing countries may not be capable of 
effectively targeting the transfers, resulting in 
leakages and rent-seeking giving a fillip to so-
called bad inequalities. Use of ICT for better 
information flow, enabling more effective 
identification of beneficiaries and more efficient 
delivery of transfers can, of course, cut down 
such misallocations and leakages. 
Given that inequality in many societies has 
assumed unprecedented magnitude, 
unconventional and radical forms of transfers 
are being advocated. The idea of Universal Basic 
Income has been on the discourse. As for 
gathering resources for carrying out such 
transfers, Stiglitz and Piketty’s calls for higher 
wealth and inheritance taxes are now finding 
greater acceptance among economists and 
policymakers. 
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